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The Great Recession, the global financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2007, has 
revealed a number of weaknesses in the EU framework for fiscal surveillance and fiscal 
policy coordination as enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). First, existing 
provisions concerning the reporting of government finance statistics did not guarantee the 
necessary quality of data across all countries. Second, in the economic good years preceding 
the crisis the SGP did not encourage Member States to create fiscal space for bad economic 
times. Second, the fundamental tenets underpinning the Pact, namely that fiscal discipline 
coupled with low and stable inflation would be sufficient to secure overall macroeconomic 
stability, turned out to be wrong. Important macro imbalances outside the fiscal area 
translated, to a significant degree, into government liabilities when they unwound during the 
crisis. Third, the SGP lacked provisions to mitigate severe economic stress. It does not allow 
for discretionary fiscal expansions, unless a country has significantly overachieved its 
budgetary objectives. The stabilisation function of fiscal policy is entrusted to automatic 
stabilisers which in the face of the Great Recession were deemed not to provide sufficient 
support. Fourth, the EU fiscal surveillance also lacks a framework for crisis resolution, 
notably when it becomes a sovereign debt crisis as was the case in spring 2010. 
 
In clear contrast to the first crisis of the Pact in November 2003, when Germany and France 
decided to flout the provisions of EU fiscal surveillance, many observers no longer believe the 
Pact can be mended. In the current debate, the focus is no longer on how to improve this or 
that part of surveillance as was the case in 2004-05. The prevailing view now seems to be the 
following: do not shed additional tears on a dead body; rather concentrate on what to do when 
the chips are down.  
 We do not share this gloomy view. In our paper we acknowledge the shortcomings of the Pact 
mark-II, yet believe it is worth preserving and can and should be revived. We provide a 
diagnosis of how the SGP faired ahead and during the present crisis and offer a first 
comprehensive review of the ongoing academic and policy debate, including an account of 
the reform proposals adopted by the Commission on 29 September 2010.  
 
In our view, the current system of EU rules is unbalanced. It consists of very specific 
provisions on how to conduct fiscal policy making in normal times with no effective 
enforcement mechanisms, and of no or extremely tight provisions for really bad economic 
times, like the Great Recession. A two-pronged approach is needed to revive the Pact: tighter 
enforcement, coupled with broader macroeconomic surveillance, in good times and an open 
window for exceptionally bad times, including a crisis resolution mechanism at the EU level.  
 
We present explicit recommendations and proposals on how to repair the SGP, in short how 
to make it work better. Our recommendations are close to the reform proposals advanced by 
the Commission on 29 September 2010 which in turn largely overlap with the conclusions of 
the Task Force of the European Council of 18 October 2010. 
 
Deep economic crises initiate a learning process – a search for new policies to avoid future 
economic calamity. EU is now in the middle of such a learning process. In the past, EU has 
been able to adjust to new conditions and new circumstances. There are strong reasons to 
believe that proper policy adjustments will be forthcoming, initiated and supported by the 
workings of financial markets. We conclude that the EU has a golden opportunity to learn 
from the mistakes of the past. 
 
 
 